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The 'drug policy ratchet': why do sanctions for new psychoactive drugs typically only 
go up? 
 
 
Citable statement 
The policy response to the burgeoning of new psychoactive compounds is typically to 
progressively ratchet up sanctions, a process driven by politics and ideology as well as 
analysis of the harms of drugs and policy responses. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The rapid emergence of a plethora of new psychoactive substances (NPS) in recent years has 
led to increased interest in the process of drug scheduling and control, much of it reflected in 
the pages of this journal (1-4).  A common response to these new drugs in the UK has been to 
include them in the existing legislative system for control, as shown in table one below. 
Whatever the benefits of this type of control, it is not without harm. It makes criminals of the 
substance’s users and also hinders research on its potential effects; both harmful and 
therapeutic. In political discussions, there is a tendency both to ignore the potential benefits 
of new substances and to underestimate the harms related to prohibition. In academic 
journals, the debate has focused on whether a rational, scientifically informed control 
mechanism can be developed for NPS, and what form it would take.  
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In this contribution for debate, we argue that both historical analysis and contemporary 
experience suggest that drug control cannot be understood fully as a rational, scientific 
response to the prevalence and dangers of various substances. We note that there is, in effect, 
a ratcheting process which means that substances labelled as drugs are more likely to face 
tighter rather than looser control. In recent years, this ratcheting has been extended by the 
practice of banning generic classes of substances (e.g. synthetic cannabinoids and the 
substituted cathinones) instead of individual substances, with modern generic control first 
applied in the UK in 1977 to the phenethylamine family (which includes MDMA). The 
introduction of temporary class drug orders (TCDOs) has added a further tool to the process 
of ratchet-tightening. This drug policy ratchet operates even when evidence emerges that 
tight control is failing to reduce related harms (5), or is producing unintended harms that are 
disproportionate to the benefits of control (6). Less discriminate extension of control through 
the use of generic bans is even more likely than the banning of individual substances to have 
the disadvantages of preventing research on beneficial uses and of pushing the market 
towards unknown, potentially more harmful substitutes (7). Generic bans and TCDOs may 
also make it even more difficult to loosen control. It would be very difficult scientifically to 
demonstrate that a whole group of substances pose lower risk than suggested by their initial 
classification. It would be difficult politically to avoid permanently prohibiting a drug that 
had been subject to a TCDO 
 
The historical work of David Courtwright, James Mills and others shows some of the past 
mechanisms of this ratchet. Our more recent ethnographic observations of UK policy, both in 
the civil service (Stevens) and on the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD, 
Measham), reveals some of the ways in which the policy process most often continues to 
exemplify MacCoun’s ninth implicit rule of evidence use in drug policy (8): ‘Scientific 
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research on drugs cannot motivate a change from tough law to lenient law, but it can motivate 
a change in the opposite direction’. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Historical patterns of control 
 
If we look at the decisions that have been taken on drug control under the British Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971 (MDA, see table one), then it is clear that it has been much more common 
for drugs to be controlled than to remain uncontrolled after risk assessment, and for them to 
be moved up classes and schedules than down in the legal control system.  Often this has 
been in accordance with recommendations of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs 
(ACMD). It is worth noting that the only occasions on which the UK government has 
explicitly ignored the advice of the ACMD - on cannabis in 1978 and 2008, MDMA in 2009 
and (probably) khat in 2013 - the effect has been to subject a substance to a higher level of 
control than was recommended by the Council.  We suggest that the regulation of novel 
psychoactive substances should be understood in the context of the history of drug control. 
We argue that this reveals a pattern in which some psychoactive products have been 
prohibited on the basis of guilt by various kinds of association. 
 
The classification of psychoactive substances as drugs is itself tied up with the history of 
prohibition. The emergence of the word ‘drugs’ to describe these substances resulted from, 
and did not pre-exist, the creation of legal controls (9). The early measures in this field were 
driven by an alliance of moral entrepreneurs and social progressives who wished to tame the 
emerging, globalised markets for intoxicating substances (10). These were thought to pose a 
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threat both to public health and the moral order. But not all intoxicating substances ended up 
being banned. The scale, power and social embeddedness of the tobacco and alcohol 
industries have protected these commodities from prohibition (except for the interlude for 
alcohol in the USA following the National Prohibition Act of 1919) (11). They were not, and 
still are not, generally classified as drugs in the policies of most developed countries.  The 
substances that have been included in drug control are those considered to be guilty by 
deviant association, lunatic association, molecular association, or a combination of the three. 
 
The substances that were first banned, both in the USA and the UK, were those that were 
associated with use by groups who were considered as deviant from the perspective of the 
white, protestant elite who focused on the perceived threat from minority ethnic migrants and 
their ‘alien’ traditions (10, 12-15). This pattern of prohibition of substances that are 
associated with foreign ethnicities and deviant subcultures continued throughout the 20th 
century. For example, the British government has repeatedly refused to loosen control of 
MDMA, in contradiction to ACMD recommendations. This has been the favourite drug of 
the rave and dance scene from the late 1980s onwards; with rave being the only musical 
genre ever to be criminalised in the UK (in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 
1994).  It now seems likely that the government will ignore the ACMD’s recent 
recommendation not to prohibit khat. This would be another example of banning a substance 
of which the use is associated with a marginalised, migrant group.  
 
The prohibition of drugs is usually justified on the basis of their health harms. In the case of 
cannabis, this argument has focused on the harms to mental health. This was a particular 
issue in the inclusion of cannabis in the regimes of control that were established by both the 
1925 Geneva Opium Conference and the 1961 Single Convention. As Mills (13, 15) has 
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shown, both decisions were informed by highly dubious data from Dr John Warnock, the 
British colonial administrator of the Egyptian Lunacy Department  from 1895 to 1923. 
Warnock spoke little Arabic but felt himself able to conclude that 41 per cent of cases of 
insanity in Egypt were caused by cannabis. He was no doubt helped in coming to this 
conclusion by his belief that inmates’ denial of cannabis use was a sure indicator that they 
were indeed users of the substance. 
 
The 2004 downward classification of cannabis in Britain, from class B to C, is listed in table 
one as one of the recent exceptions to the rule of tightening control. The link between 
cannabis and mental health - and in particular the link between the higher THC content of 
emergent hybrid skunk and cannabis psychosis - was soon recruited to the task of arguing for 
a re-tightening of the ratchet. This was frequently exemplified by journalists and campaigners 
using stories of middle class young men whose schizophrenia followed their cannabis use to 
argue for reversal of the declassification. In justifying its decision to implement this reversal 
(despite the repeated advice of the ACMD to keep cannabis in class C), the government 
referred again to the mental health risks of cannabis use. Once again, cannabis had been 
found guilty by its association with mental illness. 
 
Some substances have been banned without evidence that they were being widely used, or 
that they were particularly harmful, but on the basis of their similarity to other banned 
substances. The 1912 International Opium Convention (Article 14) banned all new 
derivatives of opium, morphine and cocaine if they were ‘shown by research, generally 
recognised, to be liable to similar abuse and productive of like ill-effects’. But current control 
systems do not always wait for such evidence to emerge before banning new substances and 
derivatives. For example, substituted pyrovalerones (e.g. naphyrone) were banned in 2010 in 
7 
 
the UK just weeks after the substituted cathinones (e.g. mephedrone). Methoxetamine was 
banned in 2013 along with similar compounds. In both cases these generic controls were not 
introduced on the basis of evidence of existing use or harm, or even of desirability amongst 
users (16), but because of presumed harm through a pharmacological comparison with other 
controlled substances, their relative potency and effects (17, 18). Thus, despite the lack of 
evidence of significant existing use or harm, whole groups of chemical compounds have been 
identified and controlled through generic bans in a process of guilt by molecular association.  
 
Patterns in contemporary policy making 
 
The history of drug policy making shows that decisions on drug control have not resulted 
solely from dispassionate analysis of relative harms. Instead, it reveals patterns of thinking 
about the control of psychoactive substances that continue to this day. Our experience of 
working with policy makers shows some continuing systematic influences on evidence use in 
policy making that tend to support the drug policy ratchet. Some of this experience has been 
published by Stevens (19). This ethnographic study was based on six months working as a 
policy adviser to the highest levels of the British civil service on issues of drugs and crime. It 
showed how, as in other jurisdictions (20), these civil servants faced an avalanche of 
information that they could potentially draw on in making their policy recommendations to 
ministers. They knew it was impossible to digest all this information, so they developed rules 
of thumb by which to judge which reports were worth reading. They learnt what type of 
evidence was likely to help them succeed in producing policies that found favour with 
ministers and their special advisers. In form, they learnt that persuasive evidence was most 
likely to be quantitative, unambiguous and suitable for presentation in simple graphs (known 
colloquially as ‘killer charts’). In content, the evidence that was most likely to be chosen was 
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that which did not disrupt existing policy narratives.  The role of evidence in policy is often 
to support rather than to challenge the currently dominant policy discourse (21, 22). As noted 
by an early critic of the MDA (23), ‘political parameters delimit the possible universe of 
discourse for what purport to be open-ended scientific debates’. 
 
One of the dominant tropes of current political narratives on drug policy is the desire to 
appear tough. During the ethnographic study of Stevens, frequent use was made of the word 
‘totemic’ to describe policies that showed the government to be tough in its quest to protect 
the public from harmful people and substances. Tough policies were described as being 
especially appropriate for ‘other’ people, including unruly youths and ‘high harm causing 
users’. This desire to use drug policy to send a tough message has frequently informed drug 
classification decisions, most recently the swift passage of legislation banning substituted 
cathinones in April 2010. This was given cross-party support less than three weeks before a 
general election. Indeed, whilst many liberal commentators criticised the ‘pre-election 
prohibition fast-track’ (24, 25), the criticism from the Conservative Opposition (26). The 
ACMD review was pre-empted both by the national press, reporting that a ban was ’likely’ 
(27), and by the Labour Prime Minister, who declared that once he heard the ACMD’s 
advice, he would take ‘take immediate action. We are determined to act to prevent this evil 
from hurting the young people of our country’ (28). It is this type of political rhetoric that 
would make it so difficult to reverse a ban made under a TCDO. 
 
Of course, the narrative of ‘totemic toughness’ is not the only one that is told in policy 
discussions. There is also the narrative of evidence-based policy. It is worth reflecting here on 
the work of Thomas Mathiesen (29).  He coined the phrase ‘silent silencing’ for the processes 
by which inconvenient truths are diverted from impacting on policy. One of these processes, 
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which Mathiesen calls ‘absorption’, occurs when an alternative vision that opens up 
possibilities of long-term fundamental change is accepted in name and partially in practice, 
but it is then set to the task of continuing the existing system of control. This can be seen in 
the absorption of the idea of evidence-based policy making in the field of drug policy. As 
demonstrated by the authors referred to above, evidence was called on throughout the 20th 
century to provide justifications for drug control decisions. The creation of the MDA itself 
followed some recommendations from the precursor of the ACMD - the Advisory Committee 
on Drug Dependence – and gave this committee a statutory footing (13). However, decisions 
in the last decade on cannabis, MDMA and (probably) khat show that politicians sometimes 
choose to ignore the recommendations of independent experts, despite their pledges of 
allegiance to evidence-based policy. In line with MacCoun’s ninth law, they have ignored 
ACMD advice when it has been to loosen control, but not when it has been to tighten the 
ratchet. Please do not read this paragraph, or indeed this article, as a plea for scientists to be 
left alone to make policy decisions without reference to the democratic process. Please do 
note the way in which political rhetoric absorbs and reproduces the demand for evidence to 
be respected, while political practice continues to insert other, unacknowledged interests into 
the process of decision making.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Both historical analysis and contemporary ethnographic experience suggests to us that the 
metaphor of the ratchet is a useful device for understanding developments in drug control and 
classification decisions. Legislative control tends to be tightened. Occasionally, the ratchet 
slips and a drug moves down a class. But the ratchet is usually re-tightened in due course.  
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Some might argue that increasing control is necessary under the precautionary principle; it 
makes sense to impose control on little-known substances that may turn out to be harmful 
before a sizeable market emerges. But this principle fails to explain why some relatively 
well-known substances have been moved to more tightly controlled classes when this is not 
justified by the evidence of associated harms (e.g. cannabis in 2009, psilocybin mushrooms in 
2005 and khat in 2013) and others have not been moved to a less tightly controlled class 
when evidence suggests that harms may initially have been overestimated (e.g. MDMA). 
Neither does this principle explain the move towards very restrictive scheduling, nor the 
move towards blanket generic controls, both of which deny any potential therapeutic or 
recreational use of NPS which may emerge as relatively low harm (30) . 
 
In contrast, we have suggested that the ratchet can be explained by long standing tendencies 
to criminalise users of psychoactive substances that become associated with stigmatised 
groups, with mental illness or with chemically similar substances that have been banned 
already.  In addition, there are patterns of speech and action within the contemporary 
‘thoughtworld’ (31) of civil servants and politicians that tend to extend, rather than limit, the 
scope of legislative control of NPS. This is evident in, among other developments, the shift to 
TCDOs and generic controls.  
 
This is not a fully determined, inevitable process. It can be contested by a range of 
researchers, writers and activists. We suggest that recognition of the ratchet and some of the 
ways in which it works can help us to use evidence and public deliberation to better fit drug 
policies to the prospects of reducing harms.   
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Table 1: Changes to drug classification under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and Drugs Act 
2005 
Changes that have increased penalties  Changes that have reduced penalties 
Selected drugs that 
have been placed 
under control by 
MDA or Drugs Act 
since 1971 
Drugs that have been moved 
to a higher class in MDA 
 Drugs that have been taken 
out of control by MDA since 
1971 
Drugs that have 
been moved to a 
lower class in 
MDA 
Phenethylamines, 
including MDMA 
(into class A in 
1977) 
Methaqualone (from C to B 
in 1984) 
 Propylhexedrine (removed 
from class C in 1996) 
Nicodicodine 
(from A to B in 
1973) 
Anabolic steroids 
(into class C in 
1996) 
Methylamphetamine (from B 
to A in 2006 
  
Cannabinol and 
its derivatives 
(from A to C in 
2004) 
Unprocessed  fungi 
containing psilocin 
or its esters (into 
class A in 2005) 
Cannabinol and its 
derivatives (from C to B in 
2008) 
  Cannabis (from B 
to C in 2004) 
Ketamine (into class 
C in 2006) 
Cannabis (from C to B in 
2009) 
  
 
Gamma-
butyrolactone (into 
class C in 2009) 
Pipradrol (from C to B in 
2012) 
  
 
Synthetic 
cannabinoid 
agonists (into class 
B in 2009) 
   
 
Piperazines (into 
class C in 2009) 
   
 
Substituted 
cathinones (into 
class B in 2010) 
   
 
Substituted 
pyrovalerones (into 
class B in 2010) 
   
 
Generically defined 
pipradrol derivatives 
(into class B in 
2012) 
   
 
Methoxetamine and 
generically defined 
analogues of 
ketamine and 
phencyclidine (into 
class B in 2013) 
   
 
Source: Based on appendix one of (32), with more recent additions.  
 
